Friday May 24, 2024

The UK Maritime Trade Operations agency reported that a merchant vessel was boarded 420 nautical miles southeast of Merca, Somalia. A resurgence in pirate activity, dormant since 2018, has been noted since late last year.

The European Union’s anti-piracy force in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea, Operation Atalanta, on Thursday flagged a possible pirate attack on the Liberian-flagged merchant vessel Basilisk off the coast of Somalia.
Somali pirates caused havoc in the waters off the east African country’s long coastline between 2008 and 2018. They had been dormant until late last year when pirate activity started to pick up again.

The EU force said in a statement that the suspected attack happened about 380 nautical miles east of the Somali capital Mogadishu while the vessel was heading north.

“One of Atalanta warships in the vicinity has been the first actor to respond. EUNAVFOR ATALANTA is taking the appropriate actions to respond,” it added.

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) agency earlier said it had received a report of a vessel being boarded 420 nautical miles southeast of Merca, Somalia.

An unknown number of unauthorised people from two small craft were reported to have boarded the vessel, according to UKMTO.

Friday May 24, 2024

(ERGO) – Farming families in Dhardhaar village in central Somalia’s Mudug region are struggling to recover from crop losses caused by flash flooding last year that came on top of years of devastating drought.

Abdi Isse Ereg was among the local farmers who planted in September 2023 when seasonal deyr rainfall arrived, giving hope that the long four-year drought was over.

However, torrential rains began on 25 October 2023 causing floods that wiped out all the newly planted crops on Abdi’s three hectare farm.

“You can understand what it’s like for someone who had planted his crops but lost them! We can only complain to God. We had high expectations of improving our lives but it didn’t happen,” he said.

Abdi has no alternative source of income and has had to depend on his relatives in Bandiradley town, who send him small amounts of food. He said they use the little food sparingly, cooking one meal a day for the family of 13.

The maize and beans he had stored from his last harvest has all run out.

He took loans from local businessmen in Bandiradley, 70 km southwest of Galkayo, but they refused any more credit when they realised his farm had failed. He owes $2,300 and is always being reminded about his debts.

“The loan repayment is long overdue. I used to tell them my farm was almost ready for harvest. But the business people want their money and I don’t have anything in my hands,” he said.

Abdi’s five years in farming have been blighted by climatic extremes and huge losses. The 12 goats he has left are mostly young and don’t meet market standards so he can’t sell them off.

Neighbouring farmer Hassan Adan Hashi is in a similar position.

“This disaster has affected our lives. We were poor farmers and our crops were uprooted in the floods while others were submerged in rainwater. Most of our crops were destroyed,” he said.

Hassan was hoping to make $2,000 from his farm after the expected harvest in January. Two other families related to him were also counting on the farm. They helped with the farm work and were waiting to get their share of the harvest.

Hassan has turned to construction work on a site five kilometres away from his house in Bandiradley, where he makes $14 for two days work a week.

“This work is hard but it is necessary since I have a family, it is upon me to take care of my family. I get to work early in the morning and we work until 1:00 pm, but still we don’t get work every day,” he complained.

He has debts of $1,700 at local stores and his family’s store of sorghum, maize and beans has already run out.

The head of the farmers’ association in Dhardhaar, Abdirashid Mohamed Hersi, said 51 farming families in the village lost their crops in the torrential rain and flash floods that nobody had been prepared for.

Most had used up the small amounts of food they had stored from the previous harvest that was reduced by the drought.

“The problem was two-fold, on one side the people didn’t have training on to how to deal with the floods and at the same time they were too poor to invest in systems to avert the flood effects. You can imagine how much this has affected them,” he said.

Friday May 24, 2024
By ABDULKADIR KHALIF

Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has won over key federal state leaders to amend the first four chapters of the constitution, part of the promise he made when he came to power two years ago.

But he must now contend with those who see the process as flawed.

The details emerged last week when the National Consultative Council (NCC) he chairs met for the 9th time and agreed on a way forward.

The NCC is a caucus between the President, his Prime Minister Hamza Barre, Deputy Prime Minister Salah Ahmed Jama in the attendance of the leaders of four Federal Member States (FMS): Jubbaland, Galmudug, Hirshabelle and South West states plus the Mayor of Mogadishu.

Puntland boycotted the meeting but President Mohamud may rest easy for now because a majority of the states backed him in spite of initial rumours they won’t attend.

One of his other opponents, ex-president Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, warned that the outcome of the NCC meeting will worsen the political tension and damage state-building and unity of the nation.

“Ignoring the genuine concerns of Puntland in regards the way the meetings are conducted is utter disregard of democratisation of the country,” Farmaajo stressed, reiterating the dictum that Puntland is the ‘mother of Somalia’s federalisation.’

Puntland State President Said Abdullahi Deni claimed he had been sidelined.

“Decisions made by a few people do not truly represent the community’s view, standing for waste of time,” Deni remarked.

“I hope common sense prevails and these individuals (NCC meeting participants) consider the complexity of the country’s situation.”

The NCC said they will go ahead with their earlier plans to endorse four chapters of the constitution which the federal parliament had identified and approved for review. The bone of contention, however, remains on security and structures that will run it.

On Sunday, former Somalia president Sharif Sheikh Ahmed used the social media of Himilo Qaran, the political party he chairs, to express his opposition to the NCC continuing to come up with disappointing results.

“What we are seeing and hearing is not what the people have been expecting.”

Many politicians like former prime minister Hassan Ali Khayre who together with follow former prime ministers, Omar Abdirashid Sharmarke and Abdiweli Ali Gas criticised back in March the lack of wide consultations when dealing with the constitution.

One other points generating controversies is the choice of the NCC meeting participants agreeing to synchronise all elections at federal and member states levels. Many view the simultaneous election timetable as favouring state presidents whose tenure is lapsing, and they embrace the concurrent elections as term extensions.

A reviewed constitution will likely wipe out any terms they have served. But it will also grant more time for them in office as a transition period.

Somalia has always haggled over its constitution over the last decade. The NCC has pushed for proposals such as limiting the multiparty system to three parties, and the election of the president directly by the voters.

The popularly elected president, according to the endorsed four chapters of the constitution will have powers to appoint and fire ministers without parliamentary role.

Dr Afyare Abdi Elmi, a researcher professor at City University in Mogadishu, expressed dismay when the first four chapters were endorsed.

“In reality, almost every article and/or clause has been either modified or changed. Many new articles and clauses have been introduced,” Dr Elmi stated.

“If the remaining chapters of the constitution mirror the four chapters presented here, it is going to be a new constitution,” he added.

NCC had proposed for elections to take place in June 2024 and state presidential elections by November 2024 via a three-party system. But this was seen as impossible, considering the country’s security situation.

However, delaying the election to unify the terms could be seen as a backdoor extension of terms for those who have finished theirs.

Hassan Ahmed Aidarus, a political observer in Mogadishu, is not surprised by the opposition from former leaders.

“They know what they are talking about, based on their experience,” Aidarus told The EastAfrican.

He quoted a local Somali proverb: “You cannot hide behind a tree from a man who himself hides behind a tree,” referring to an attempt at game of wits.

Friday May 24, 2024

Tens of thousands of students in Somalia’s central Hiran region have been forced to stay out of schools after heavy rains flooded the institutions.

According to Somali education officials, more than 37,000 students in this region in central Somalia are no longer in school due to the impact of recent flooding. The area has been battered by heavy rains resulting in severe flooding in schools.

Parents are worried about how the disruption of education will affect their children’s performance in the upcoming national examinations, and the floods also raised concerns of local teachers about the long-term impact on the education.

“The learning materials have been destroyed and the classrooms have been damaged. It will be very difficult to recover, because most of the students have been displaced to far away locations, and it will be hard to bring them back and resume lessons,” said Elmi Hashi Dhalin, a teacher in Somalia.

Parents of the affected students have been appealing to the government to intervene.

“There is no learning here for the children. There is water everywhere. As parents, we are calling upon the Ministry of Education to establish schools in higher grounds, so that when the flooding season comes, students can continue their learning activities,” Barre Ali Gedi, a student parent.

Last year, the Somali government organized special exams after similar incidents of flooding disrupted the exam timetable. Officials say they will do all they can to help.

“The students in this region always have the worry of not taking part in the examination exercise despite hard work and preparation due to the flood havoc. We hope that will not happen again this year, ” said Mustaf Osman Mohamud, director of education of the Beledweyn District in Somalia.

Friday May 24, 2024

After more than 30 years, in 2023 the UN arms embargo on the government of Somalia was fully lifted. However, questions have been raised about the risks associated with this decision, with many fearing a further proliferation of weapons in a country where instability is widespread, the illicit arms market pervasive and the government lacks full control of its territory.

According to the results of the 2023 Global Organized Crime Index, Somalia hosts one of the most pervasive arms trafficking markets in Africa (scoring 9 points out of 10, an increase of 0.5 points since 2021).

The number of illicit weapons circulating in the country, ranging from small arms and light weapons to assault rifles, is significant and involves various types of criminal groups. In addition to local clan militias and transnational criminal networks, militant groups linked to al-Shabaab or the Somali faction of the Islamic State are heavily involved in the market, using weapons to carry out their violent attacks and to engage in other types of trafficking.

Despite these challenges, the UN Security Council (UNSC) decided to end the embargo on the supply of weapons to the Somali government and its security forces (but at the same time extended for one year the sanctions regime, including the arms embargo, imposed on al-Shabaab militants). First imposed by UNSC Resolution 733, on 23 January 1992, the embargo on the Somali government was designed to stem the flow of weapons into the country during the civil war that followed the ousting of President Mohamed Siad Barre. Over the past three decades, the embargo has been amended through subsequent resolutions, and due to improvements observed in the marking and registration of weapons, the proposal to fully lift it was eventually adopted.

The move signalled the belief that Somalia would be able to strengthen its security capacity and provide for its own defence. In the words of the country’s UN envoy, Abukar Dahir Osman, the decision allows the country to ‘bolster the capacity of the Somali security forces by accessing lethal arms and equipment to adequately safeguard [their] citizens and [their] nation’. However, concerns have been raised about the difficulty of consistently implementing a weapons and ammunition management strategy, and calls have been made for Somalia’s neighbours and allies to support the government in its capacity-building process.

The number and security levels of ammunition storage facilities in Somalia are still considered by many to be insufficient, with a risk of leakages from national stockpiles and arms depots. Reportedly, arms diverted to the black market have often ended up in the wrong hands and have been used in attacks by al-Shabaab militants. Sceptics recall how this issue was exacerbated following the partial lifting of the UN arms embargo on Somalia in 2013, which allowed the Somali government to legally import weapons and ammunition up to a prescribed calibre.

According to a Reuters investigation, around 35 to 40 per cent of the weapons imported by Mogadishu ended up on the illicit market in the three years following the easing of the embargo.

These considerations have sparked a debate on whether the full lifting of the arms embargo was too premature a decision. The capacity of Somali institutions to handle a larger influx of weapons that would inevitably follow the UNSC resolution has been questioned. Besides concerns around the security of the country’s storage facilities, some argue that the risk of arms being diverted to criminal syndicates or terrorist groups can be linked to a number of structural shortcomings and domestic dynamics that still affect Somalia’s political and social landscape.

One is the presence of clan militias, some of which are reportedly fighting alongside the national army in its military operations against al-Shabaab and have relatively easy access to arms, making the country’s internal situation even more volatile. Given the wavering loyalty of these militias to the Somali security forces, the arms flows that would result from the lifting of the embargo could alter the precarious relationship between them and the federal government, with the collateral effect of intensifying the cycle of violence as clans vie for territorial control and political influence.

This social fragmentation adds to the Somali government’s low level of trust and accountability among its people, which is exacerbated by widespread corruption throughout the state apparatus. Indeed, Somalia is considered one of the most fragile and corrupt countries in the world, with state officials reportedly involved in carrying out or facilitating criminal activities, including arms trafficking.

Another major risk is that the Somali government does not fully control all of its ports of entry. According to the 2023 Global Organized Crime Index, Somalia’s territorial integrity was among the country’s lowest scoring indicators (at 1.5 out of 10) within an already weak overall resilience framework (with an average score of 1.79 out of 10). Without effective border control and management of key nodes, such as ports, new arms shipments into the country risk ending up in the arsenals of criminal organizations and militant groups. The existence of unregulated arms markets in the country, where weapons often leaked from federal government stocks are openly sold, is another major problem and underlines the difficulty of controlling and tracing the flow of arms within the country.

Broader insecurity in East Africa is another factor that will potentially fuel the influx of weapons into Somalia and facilitate the development of extensive arms-trafficking routes. Weapons-smuggling networks are known to extend beyond Somalia’s borders and reach armed groups in neighbouring countries such as Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia. The recent civil war in Ethiopia has contributed to an escalation in the supply of small arms and light weapons – as evidenced by a sharp increase in the country’s arms trafficking score under the Global Organized Crime Index, from 7 to 8.5. Due to generally inadequate monitoring and patrolling capacities, weapons flow freely across East Africa and increased availability of arms in one country is likely to affect illicit arms markets in neighbouring locations.

Furthermore, Somalia’s proximity to the unstable Middle East and recent developments in the Red Sea – which has come under recent attacks by Yemen’s Houthis in response to the Israeli campaign against Hamas – are another dangerous source of instability.

As these crises drag on, demand for weapons is likely to grow and maritime arms-trafficking networks are likely to become increasingly entrenched. The potential effects of widespread insecurity in Western Asia on the Horn of Africa have been confirmed in recent years by strong evidence of illicit weapons destined for use in the Yemeni civil war reportedly spilling over into Somalia. For example, since December 2020, research in Somalia by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime has documented the presence of weapons such as Type 56-1 assault rifles – allegedly supplied by Iran and destined for the Houthi insurgents but diverted via maritime routes to the northern regions of Somalia.

In this complex landscape, an increase in the volume of weapons entering Somalia after the lifting of the embargo could well exacerbate internal and external problems, ignite an arms race among non-state actors and turn the country into a major arms-trafficking corridor, with potential repercussions for the wider region. Moreover, the expected withdrawal of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia by the end of 2024 appears to be a further obstacle to the management of security in the country.

Despite these risks, there is a general conviction in the international community that the time has come for the Somali security forces to provide for the defence of their country by any means necessary, including importing military equipment and weapons.

However, ensuring that the Somali government can effectively control its borders, regulate its arms markets and secure its own weaponry will be essential to avoid serious security risks in East Africa and beyond.

This analysis is part of the GI-TOC’s series of articles delving into the results of the Global Organized Crime Index. The series explores the Index’s findings and their effects on policymaking, anti-organized crime measures and analyses from a thematic or regional perspective.

Friday May 24, 2024

Kenyan President William Ruto has raised alarms about the potential rise in terrorism following the withdrawal of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). During his state visit to the United States, Ruto urged American intervention to prevent security deterioration in the region.

Speaking on Tuesday, Ruto explained that the drawdown of ATMIS troops, scheduled according to a predetermined timeline rather than the actual security conditions, could lead to a resurgence of terrorist activities in Somalia. He emphasized that both he and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud are deeply concerned about the impending security vacuum.

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“Today, Kenya is backstopping the security challenges in the Horn of Africa. Before I came here on Saturday, I had an engagement with the President of Somalia. And we have serious security challenges because there is an impending drawdown of ATMIS that is calendar-based, not conditions-based,” Ruto stated.

The withdrawal has been contentious. On May 5, the Somali government unexpectedly requested the United Nations to expedite the conclusion of the peacekeeping mission, despite having earlier sought an extension. The move caught the international community off guard.

In response, Kenya’s Defence Secretary Aden Duale and Michael Hammer, the U.S. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, met on May 9 to discuss security arrangements post-ATMIS. “Our discussions focused on post-ATMIS security arrangements in Somalia, reinforcing our commitment to peacekeeping and counterterrorism efforts,” Duale said.

Ruto’s state visit to the U.S. also involved discussions on global security and economic issues. President Joe Biden expressed gratitude for Kenya’s commitment to deploying police forces to Haiti, supported by a $300 million U.S. contribution to a multinational force.

The visit marked the first state visit by an African leader to the U.S. since 2008, underscoring the strategic partnership between the two nations. Biden announced plans to designate Kenya as a major non-NATO ally, reflecting the growing security collaboration between Kenya and the U.S.

Ruto’s decision to commit Kenyan forces to international conflicts has faced domestic scrutiny. Critics argue that Kenya should prioritize its own economic and security challenges. Legal challenges have also emerged, questioning the constitutional validity of deploying Kenyan forces abroad without reciprocal agreements.

Despite these challenges, Ruto maintains that global peace and security are collective responsibilities. “Kenya believes in the duty of every democracy to contribute to global peace and justice. This principle drives our actions in Haiti and beyond,” Ruto explained.